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and on the Maryland Declaration of
Rights. Colbert, 593 A.2d at 228
(quoting Buzbee v. Journal Newspaper, 465 A.2d 426 (Md. 1983». The
court further stated that the function of
the judicial process is influenced by
public access. Id. The court observed
that access to pretrial proceedings
allows the public to "evaluate the
work of trial judges, prosecutors and
public defenders in the criminal justice system." Id.
The court, nevertheless, recognized that the right of access to pretrial
proceedings is not absolute. Id. The
court emphasized that there are limited circumstances where a defendant's
right to a fair trial outweigh the constitutional presumption of openness.
Id. The court reasoned that closure
should be considered on a case-bycase basis and the public should be
given an opportunity to question their
exclusion. Id. The court further
determined that a motion for closure
should be docketed prior to the hearing to provide adequate notice to oppose the motion. Id. at229. Thecourt
stated that in situations where advance
notice is impracticable, any individuals in the courtroom should be given a
reasonable opportunity to oppose the
closure. Id.
In the present case, the trial court
ruled on the closure motion before
arguments in opposition were heard.
Id; As a result, the court of appeals
determined that notice and reasonable
opportunity to oppose the closure were
not provided, thus violating the public's
and the media's constitutional rights.
Id.
The court reasoned that the party
seeking closure must persuade the
court that their rights will be infringed
upon by an open hearing, and that
there are no reasonable alternatives to
closure. Id. Additionally, the court
emphasized that when a defendant
asks for closure under the Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial, the
specific findings by the court must be
made on the record. Id. at230. Under
this fair trial argument, the trial court

should consider the extent of publicity
the case has and will receive after a
public hearing. Id. In addition, the
trial court must specifically determine
that closure is the only reasonable way
to protect the defendant's right to a
fair trial. Id. The court further added
that if there are any alternatives to
closure which will protect the
defendant's rights, these alternatives
must be employed prior to closure.
Id.
The court next addressed an inherent problem at the hearing of a motion
to close. The court considered the
situation arising when the moving
party informs the court of the reasons
to close and the sensitive nature of the
information sought to be protected has
necessarily been revealed. To avoid
this problem, the court reasoned that
the trial court must receive sensitive
evidence in private, but on the record.
Id. Further, the court agreed that the
sensitive portions of the record may be
sealed but only as long as reasonably
necessary. Id.
Because in the present case the
trial court granted the motion to close
before making the required specific
findings, the court determined that the
trial court's statement that Colbert
could only be afforded a fair trial by
closure was not supported by any
facts. Id. Therefore, the trial court
erred in closing the hearing and sealing all portions of the record. The
court opined that the trial judge could
have heard the sensitive evidence in
private and sealed only that part protecting the public's right of access to
therecords. Id. When sealing records,
the court explained that the closure
must be narrowly tailored and that the
interests protected must be articulated
and supported by specific findings.
Id.
In reaching its conclusion, the
court of appeals balanced First Amendment rights of public access in criminal cases against the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights to a fair trial. As
a result, the public will be excluded
only when the defendant's right to a

fair trial cannot be protected. However, the burden on trial judges is now
heavier both in giving the media an
opportUnity to be heard prior to closure and in specifically articulating
the grounds for closure. Also on a
broader scale, the opinion has reinforced the right of media access to
criminal trials as guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.

- Bruce D. Hechmer
Federated Department Stores v. Le:

EMPLOYER POTENTIALLY
LIABLE TO ITS EMPWYEEFOR
TORTIOUS CONDUCT OF A
CO-EMPWYEE.
In Federated Department Stores v.
Le, 595 A.2d 1067 (Md. 1991), the
Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act permits employees to sue
employers under common law in cases
where an employee deliberately injures a co-employee. In so holding,
the court expanded the liability of
Maryland employers for injuries to
their employees.
Federated Department Stores, doing business as Bloomingdales, employed Thach Le as a salesperson. On
the morning of April 11, 1983, he left
his briefcase in an employee storeroom. Upon his return to the storeroom, he was asked to accompany a
security guard to the security office.
The Regional Director of Security,
Suzanne Spahr, was there waiting for
Le. Spahr accused Le of attempting to
steal a calculator which was in his
briefcase. Although he denied the
allegation, Le claims that Spahr forced
him to sign a prepared confession
before she would allow him to leave
the room. Federated terminated Le
shortl y thereafter. Le asserted that he
later learned that Mrs. Spahr had
framed him. Le sued Federated Department Stores for damages, charging Federated with false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and defamation.
Federated filed a motion for sum22.2/fhe Law Forum - 23

mary judgment claiming that the exclusivity provision ofsection 15 of the
Workers' Compensation Act barred
Le's action. Section 15 states in
pertinent part that «an employer's
I iabil ity for payment of workers' compensation provided for in this statute
shall be the exclusive remedy." Id. at
1069. Federated additionally argued
that although section 44 of the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act provides an exception to the exclusivity
rule by permitting common law actions against employers for deliberate
torts, it did not apply to Le. Id.
Federated cited Maryland case law for
the proposition that an employee could
sue only if the potential tort-feasor
was the employer's «alter ego" or
acted with its express authorization.
Id. at 1070 (citing Continental Casualty Co. v. Mirabile, 449 A.2d 1176
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982)). Federated argued that because Spahr was
not its " alter ego," nor acting with its
express authority, Le's only redress
was governed by the terms of the Act.
Accepting this interpretation, the circuit court granted Federated's motion.
The court of special appeals reversed, stating that because Le's case
involved non-physical injuries, it did
not fall within the provision of the
Workers Compensation Act. Id. The
intermediate appellate court distinguished Le's case from earlier cases
on the ground that the latter dealt with
physical injuries while Le's injuries
were non-physical, thereby allowing
Le's action to proceed. Id. Federated
appealed to the court of appeals which
affirmed the intermediate court's decision on different grounds.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by interpreting the appropriate sections of the Workers' Compensation Act. Id. at 1071. The court first
reiterated the basic principal that section 44 operates as an exception to the
exclusivity requirement of section 15
and provides that an employee shall
have the " option to take benefits under
article or sue where injury or death
24 - The Law Forum/22.2

results from the deliberate intention of
employer. " Id. (quoting Md. Ann.
Code art. 101 § 44 (1985 & 1990
Supp.)). The court held that the prior
decisions of the court of special appeals construed the section too narrowly by requiring that the tort-feasor
be the employer's « alter ego" or act
with its express authority. Id. at 1072.
The court of appeals declined to
adopt the " alter ego" test and allowed
Le to bring the common law suit. Id.
In support of its broad application of
section 44, the court cited decisions
which support an employee's right to
sue his employer for "some intentional torts based on the employer's
vicarious liability for the conduct of a
co-employee." Id. at 1073-74. The
court, however, decl ined to define the
parameters of the section 44 exception. Id.
The court in Federated Department Stores v. Le has significantly
broadened the interpretation of section 44 causes of action and the exclusivity exception in the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act. In so doing,
the court aligned Maryland with the
majority of other jurisdictions which
have similar exclusivity provisions
and exceptions in their respective
Workers' Compensation Acts. Maryland employers are now subject to
increased liability for injuries to their
employees. Potential plaintiffs may
now seek a common law action against
their employers for the deliberate actions of co-employees causing nonphysical injury. In this respect, more
employers may have to defend themselves against claims arising from situations over which they have little
control. Moreover, the small business owner who, although able to
exert some control over the situation,
may not have the financial means to
afford the increased litigation costs of
actions now permitted.
- Steven B. Drucker

Alexander & Alexander v. Evander &
Assoc. , Inc.: COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS VACATES STATE'S
LARGEST PUNITIVE AWARD.
Acting in accordance with a recent
United States Supreme Court opinion,
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland recognized in Alexander &
Alexander v. Evander & Assoc. , Inc. "
596 A.2d 687 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1991), an opportunity to review
Maryland's system of awarding punitive damages. In holding that the
award in Alexander violated due process, the court vacated the award and
remanded for retrial the issues of
whether, and in what amount, punitive damages should have been rendered.
B. Dixon Evander & Associates,
Inc. (" Evander"), an insurance broker, secured medical malpractice insurance for doctors at the University
of Maryland Hospital with an insurer,
Mutual Fire, whose underwriter was
Shand, Morahan and Co. (" Shand" ).
Shand was a subsidiary of another
broker, Alexander & Alexander (" A
& A"). Evander and Shand had a
contract whereby Evander was to be
Shand's exclusive representative for
professional malpractice coverage.
In order to obtain less expensive
malpractice coverage, the hospital secured A & A as its new exclusive
broker in 1985. This decision created
a conflict with Shand's agreement to
underwrite exclusively for A & A.
Aware of the conflict, Shand officials
refused to place any of the hospital's
insurance needs with its carrier except
through Evander. At trial, it was
revealed that A & A officials had
pressured Shand officials to accept
hospital policies through A & A in
spite of Shand's promise to Evander.
Evander claimed that A & A had
tortiously interfered with his contract
with Shand, thereby depriving him of
commissions from that contract.
Evander additionally alleged that A &
A had conspired to harm his business
reputation. Testimony at trial revealed that an A & A vice-president

